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Cross border cooperation between law enforcement
agencies continues to play a key role in our fight
against organised crime groups who cause harm to
communities on both sides of the border.  Organised
crime groups often operate on a cross border basis, by
disregarding the border or by using it to facilitate
criminality. Consequently, it is essential that authorities
on both sides of the border cooperate together and
with other law enforcement agencies in order to
thwart the threat posed by these groups.  
Law enforcement agencies on both sides of the border
maintain an effective working relationship, the results
of which are evident through a substantial number of
successful cross border investigations. These
partnerships are achieved through efforts such as
regular contact, intelligence sharing, parallel
investigations and utilisation of new technology that
enables further linkage between forces. Additionally,
joint training is undertaken and various cross border
working groups have been established to focus on
particular crime issues. 
The Cross Border Organised Crime Seminar is held
annually and provides an opportunity for agencies
from both jurisdictions to come together, share
experiences and focus on particular topics/issues
within organised crime. Not only are tactical
approaches and plans for future operational activity
discussed, but longer term issues and efforts are also
examined, with the aim of strengthening resilience to
the threats posed by organised crime.  
We are very pleased to present the sixth biennial Cross
Border Organised Crime Threat Assessment, which
provides an insight into organised crime activities seen
on both sides of the border. Trends and developments
across both jurisdictions are compared in an effort to
highlight similarities/differences in the threat posed
by certain areas of criminality. In some instances, such
as cybercrime and human trafficking, the threat is
similar throughout the island of Ireland, however in
other areas, such as some aspects of the drugs market,
there are key differences between the jurisdictions.  
Organised crime has become more diverse, complex
and global. It will remain a considerable challenge for
law enforcement agencies on both sides of the border
and cooperation is vital for continued success.  
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Organised crime harms communities on both sides of the border.  An organised criminal
group’s main objective is to make money and they have no respect or consideration for
those who live in their own communities.  Organised criminal groups supply illicit drugs
and dangerous goods to our friends and families and their activities have a negative
impact on legitimate business.  Information received from members of the public can
help law enforcement agencies determine the scope of criminal activity as well as
identifying those involved.  If you have any information about organised crime please
contact:
THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC
PSNI 101
AN GARDA SÍOCHÁNA CONFIDENTIAL 1800 666 111 
CRIMESTOPPERS (NI) 0800 555 111 
CRIMESTOPPERS (ROI) 1800 250 025
HMRC HOTLINE 0800 59 5000
REVENUE COMMISSIONERS 1800 295 295
A Cross Border Organised Crime Assessment 2014
8
Organised crime is becoming increasingly complex and
global in its nature, and thus presents a significant
threat to the economic prosperity of Ireland and
Northern Ireland as well as risks to the safety of the
island’s population.
Globalisation and the increasing role that technology
plays in organised crime present serious challenges 
to law enforcement agencies. Transnational 
criminals have been one of the biggest beneficiaries
of globalisation and the international trade
developments, improved international communication
and cross border links that accompany it. Variations in
laws and legislative loopholes are identified and
exploited by criminal groupings.
Whilst organised crime groups (OCGs) have an innate
hierarchical structure, there is a great deal of fluidity
amongst individuals within the groups. In some cases,
organised crime groups opportunistically form around
specific short-term schemes. Within this criminal
fraternity, a number of facilitators exist who operate
niche roles necessary for criminal operations and these
figures often provide assistance to a number of
groupings. Additionally, economic disparity could bring
individuals closer to organised crime and expand the
potential workforces of organised crime groups.
Diversification and interaction with international
criminal networks are key to the success and growth
of organised crime groups. Often an environment of
co-operation exists amongst higher level OCGs who
work together in efforts that generate profits for all
involved. Extensive association networks facilitate
these criminals as it allows them to be involved in a
number of ventures and ‘side line’ enterprises. Such
criminal expansion boosts finances and increases their
resilience to law enforcement. 
In both jurisdictions, we are now seeing the significant
presence of foreign national organised crime groups,
who bring their own knowledge and expertise to illegal
activities. Also, indigenous organised crime groups
often incorporate other nationalities into their
network, which opens up further opportunities 
for them. 
There is substantial interaction between OCGs
operating on both sides of the border and they work
together in all realms of organised criminality. Links
between dissident republicans and organised crime
groups remain a serious concern. Despite their public
denouncement of organised criminality, dissident
republicans heavily depend on organised crime to fund
their terrorist activities. A relationship of friction and
facilitation appears to exist between OCGs and some
dissident elements. “Taxing”/extortion of drug dealers
by dissident republicans has occurred in recent years.  
Mobile organised crime groupings have been an issue
in Ireland in recent years, with a number of groupings
travelling inter-regionally throughout Ireland carrying
out burglaries of commercial and residential
properties. Numerous incidents highlight cross border
activity in this regard also, with OCGs from Ireland
travelling into Northern Ireland to commit crimes and
vice versa. These groupings readily engage in violence
meaning victims and indeed anyone who disturbs their
activities, including law enforcement personnel, 
are at risk. 
The drugs industry remains the main driver behind the
activities of organised crime groups in Ireland and
Northern Ireland. Criminals are highly diverse and react
accordingly to market changes. Such changes are
influenced by home economies and the situation
within the international drugs markets. Poly drug use
(refers to users taking a variety of drugs together,
INTRODUCTION
AN OVERVIEW OF ORGANISED CRIME GROUPS
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often with alcohol) is now a common pattern of drug
use and in parallel so is poly drug trafficking (where a
variety of drugs are imported together).  The
proliferation of new psychoactive substances now
features as one of the key threats in the drugs market.
These new and emerging drugs markets are driven by
internet activity and technology allows individuals
working outside of traditional organised crime groups
to be in a position to supply such drugs. Furthermore,
the internet acts as an information hub for criminals
worldwide where they can access information on how
to manufacture their own drugs and learn new
methods of committing various kinds of crimes.
The rapid development of technology has changed the
landscape of organised crime with virtual marketplaces
and virtual currencies in operation, which provide
alternative sources of illicit goods. The internet enables
interaction between criminals and acts as an
intermediary in the trading of illegal goods and
services such as drugs, firearms, counterfeit
products/medicines, identification documents,
prostitution and material pertaining to child
exploitation. The existence of this virtual marketplace
also provides additional opportunities for criminals to
launder the proceeds of crime, particularly now with
the existence of virtual currencies.  
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Alcohol fraud involves the smuggling of alcohol from
countries with lower alcohol tax rates, excise duty
fraud and production/distribution of counterfeit
spirits.  There are a number of methods employed by
organised crime groups to commit the various types
of alcohol fraud. 
Between Northern Ireland and Ireland, there is a
significant price difference in alcohol, which further
promotes this kind of crime.  Alcohol is reported to be
on average 35% cheaper in Northern Ireland1. 
Cross border activities around counterfeit alcohol are
clearly present with a particular concentration of
illegal bottling plants/distribution points identified in
the border region.  Illicit alcohol may be transported
between jurisdictions for onward sale and materials
needed to produce the counterfeit products such as
labels/boxes/bottles can also be conveyed to either side
of the border.  Such items used in the production
process are often imported from the Far East and India.
There appears to be a growing market for illicit alcohol,
which will drive this form of fraud.  In 2013, Revenue
Commissioners in Ireland seized almost 70% more
illegal alcohol than in 20122, which supports this
assessment.  Vodka appears to be one of the main
alcoholic products that was seized in Ireland. 
In Northern Ireland, illegal bottling plants for vodka
and whiskey have been found but there are also
indications that suggest counterfeit wine is becoming 
increasingly available.     
Earlier this year, Grant Thornton conducted a number
of surveys as part of a report exploring illicit trade in
Ireland3. This survey indicated that 16% of Irish
respondents had knowingly purchased illicit alcohol4.
In late 2013, a survey carried out by Price Waterhouse
Coopers (PWC) reported that 24% of Northern Irish
respondents admitted to purchasing counterfeit
alcohol, which is proportionally higher than the 
UK average5. 
ALCOHOL FRAUD
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The health risks associated with counterfeit alcohol
cannot be underestimated.  In 2012, counterfeit
alcohol killed at least 20 people in the Czech Republic6.
Other serious effects include breathing difficulties,
liver damage and blindness.  Bottles of counterfeit
alcohol can contain a variety of harmful substances,
including those found in nail varnish remover and
windscreen wiper fluid.   
CASE STUDY
On 22nd May 2014, following an international effort
involving the Netherlands, UK and Ireland, Irish
Revenue Commissioners uncovered a counterfeit
Smirnoff production plant in a shed in Kilcurry, Co.
Louth. Over 400,000 counterfeit vodka labels were
discovered along with 120,000 bottle closures and
370,000 counterfeit Smirnoff brand cardboard outer
cases.  No counterfeit alcohol was present but a
bottle filling machine and ancillary equipment was
also seized.  Some of these products had been
imported from Rotterdam via Belfast and
transported onwards to this production plant. Two
individuals were arrested.
In September 2013, a purpose built alcohol bottling
plant was found in the South Armagh area.  Almost
2,500 litres of illicit alcohol were seized along with
bottles and labelling. 
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Cash-in-transit (CIT) robberies have seen significant
reductions in both jurisdictions over the past few
years. The reduction is likely to be due to a
combination of factors, including increased security
measures by industry and successful interventions by
law enforcement.  However it should also be noted
that in Northern Ireland at least one notable organised
crime group, historically involved in CIT attacks, were
arrested in 2013 for their involvement in drug
cultivation and supply.  It may be the case that
increased security measures and successful
interventions have resulted in groups moving into
other areas of criminality that they perceive to be
more profitable and lower risk.
Tiger kidnap7 incidents have also reduced in Ireland
and Northern Ireland in recent years, however
substantive attacks have resulted in the loss of cash
and other commodities such as jewellery.  Some of the
incidents in the past two years have involved the use
of firearms and were clearly carried out by experienced
organised crime groups.  In addition to tiger kidnaps,
which involve the taking or claiming to have taken
someone hostage, organised crime groups will also
carry out robberies and aggravated burglaries against
business owners and their staff.  Business owners
should be particularly careful about keeping takings
at home; night safes at financial institutions may
provide a better alternative, although care should be
taken not to set patterns when dropping off cash to
financial institutions or night safes.
The physical theft of ATMs initially became an issue on
the island of Ireland in 2009/10, when a series of
incidents, involving the use of stolen plant machinery,
were perpetrated on both sides of the border.  There
was one organised crime group linked to the earliest
recorded incidents, however, despite limited success in
actually gaining access to the ATMs, the subsequent
media coverage resulted in a series of ‘copycat’
offences.  Some of the identified groups were
operating on both sides of the border.  Parallel
investigations in both jurisdictions led to the number
of incidents reducing dramatically in subsequent years.
However, there continues to be sporadic incidents of
ATMs being stolen using plant machinery, including
recent incidents in counties Sligo, Down and Tyrone.
This year a new modus operandi in relation to physical
ATM attacks has also been noted.  Following a series
of incidents in Europe and Great Britain, ATM attacks
using gas have now migrated to Ireland.  Similar to the
attacks using stolen plant machinery, gas attacks cause
significant damage to properties and can lead to the
loss of valuable services in rural communities.  Gas
attacks result in an explosion taking place and pose
significant risks to emergency service responders, as
well as any members of the public who may be in the
vicinity.  There have been a small number of incidents
on both sides of the border, however early and robust
intervention by law enforcement has already led to
two significant arrests.  
CASH-IN-TRANSIT ROBBERY,
TIGER KIDNAP, ATM ATTACKS
AND LARGE SCALE THEFTS
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Metal theft incidents have decreased in both
jurisdictions in the last year.  Copper is the most
frequently targeted type of metal; accounting for
around half of all incidents on both sides of the border.
Commonly targeted items include cables/wiring, hot
water cylinders and catalytic convertors.  In Ireland the
telecoms industry have noted an increase in thefts
from locations where masts are present, including
theft of items on site such as bracings (supports) for
masts and lead batteries.  
CASE STUDY
In June 2014, an ATM ‘gas attack’ took place in the
Armagh area.  No cash was stolen on this occasion
but significant damage was caused to the ATM and
neighbouring retail premises.  Following prompt
action by law enforcement agencies, two males with
addresses in the Dublin area were subsequently
arrested and charged.
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The area of cybercrime continues to evolve at a rapid
pace and incidents are believed to be significantly
underreported.  The key threats can be categorised as
follows;
• Malware
One of the most common cybercrime offences
reported to law enforcement in both jurisdictions
is that of computer malware.  Malware is a virus
that is introduced to a computer, usually through
phishing or spam techniques (e.g. through bogus
links in unsolicited or fraudulent emails or attached
to files downloaded from the Internet) or through
insecure ports or systems.  Once a computer is
infected, malware can pass information onto
another device.  For example, in May 2014,
operational activity was carried out by law
enforcement in the UK, European Union and USA
in response to the Blackshades Malware.
Blackshades is malicious software that is used to
allow criminals to steal passwords, hack into social
media accounts, access documents, record
keystrokes, activate webcams, hold a computer to
ransom or use a computer in a denial of
service/distributed denial of service (DoS/DDoS)
attack (see point 3 for further details).  Access to
Blackshades can be purchased online by organised
crime groups and then its use can be tailored to suit
that particular group’s criminal requirements.
Another example of malware encountered locally
has been the Shylock Trojan.  Shylock infects a
computer and then attempts to seek access to
funds held in business or personal bank accounts.
The owner of a computer infected with malware
may be completely unaware.  This type of
‘crimeware’ is easily accessible online and organised
crime groups can pay for access or alternatively,
can pay another organised crime group to carry out
an attack on their behalf.
Part of the reason that malware has become more
widely reported to law enforcement is due to the
increased use of ransomware.  Ransomware is
malware that results in the computer user receiving
an extortion demand.  These will usually take the
form of a pop-up window appearing on the screen,
often branded with a law enforcement logo.  The
user will be informed that they have committed an
illegal act, usually the viewing of child pornography
and that their computer has been locked subject to
the payment of a ‘fine’.  This type of incident can
be very distressing to the user.  Another example is
that of Cryptolocker, a malware that encrypts files
and folders and demands a ransom in Bitcoins (an
unregulated virtual currency).  Individuals and
businesses may feel reluctant to report such
incidents to law enforcement due to concerns over
reputational damage or a lack of confidence in law
enforcement’s ability to investigate such incidents.
Ransomware attacks are being reported on both
sides of the border and are noted as being a growth
area in Europe as a whole.  The use of prepaid
online solutions and virtual currencies have been
major facilitating factors.  
CYBERCRIME
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• Network intrusion
Network intrusion refers to unauthorised access
being gained to computer systems.  It is believed
that a number of businesses/agencies on the island
of Ireland have suffered significant incidents,
however many have been reluctant to report these
for fear of reputational damage.  There have been
reported incidences of SQL Injection Attacks -
“Structured Query Language (SQL) is a
programming language designed to retrieve and
manage data on computer databases.  SQL
Injection Attacks are methods of hacking into and
gaining unauthorized access to such databases
connected to the internet.” 8
• Denial of service/distributed denial of
service (DoS/DDoS) attacks
DoS/DDoS attacks can be carried out by ‘hactivists’
who will perpetrate suspected network attacks,
often against infrastructure, for protest purposes
but they can also be used as part of a blackmail
incident.  Whilst no incidents of this nature are
currently being investigated on either side of the
border, this is also an area where underreporting is
believed to be an issue.  DoS/DDoS attacks are a key
risk moving forward.  
• Use of the cyber marketplace to
source ‘criminal services’
There is a growing threat of organised crime groups
using ‘services for hire’, or ‘experts’ in particular
areas of criminality, to commit ‘traditional’ crimes
such as drugs importation, extortion and fraud.
Contacts can be developed through the use of
criminal online forums and communications.
• Enablers
There is a growing threat from the use of cyber
‘enablers’, such as criminal forums, anonymous
hosting and virtual currencies.  These enablers can
provide organised crime groups with additional
ways of attempting to hide their identity and
develop global contacts.  There have already been
national reports of a noted increase in the use of
online criminal forums and communications with
“experts” advertising their services.
Both PSNI and An Garda Síochána continue to train
officers in dealing with such incidents, and
reporting is vital for law enforcement to
understand the nature and scale of the threats
being experienced locally.
CASE STUDY
PSNI have detected an increase in network intrusion
attacks (unauthorised access to computer systems)
against institutions in Northern Ireland.  These
attacks, commonly referred to as "hacking",  are
assessed to be the result of organised criminal
activity where organised crime groups are
attempting to access and steal data in order to
commit other forms of criminality.  The PSNI, with
assistance from An Garda Síochána, are investigating
one major network intrusion attempt against a
Northern Ireland institution.   
In August 2013, Gardaí arrested a male in Dublin and
seized computer equipment from his residence. This
followed an investigation led by the FBI into the
distribution of child pornography images on an
anonymous hosting site operating on the Darknet.
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Cannabis
The cannabis market continues to dominate the drug
scene on both sides of the border.  In both jurisdictions,
almost a quarter of the population report using this
drug at least once in their lifetime10, which is in line
with what is seen across Europe in general.  Survey
results from 2010/2011 indicate that 9% of recent
cannabis users would be classed as cannabis
dependent, with the majority of these being young
adult males (aged 15-34)11. 
Interest in domestic cannabis cultivation has
accelerated amongst all levels of organised crime
groups in recent years, with variances in size and
sophistication of cultivation attempts.  The island of
Ireland is clearly seen as an attractive location for
these operations.  Law enforcement continually
disrupts large “grow houses” but this does not appear
to be an effective deterrent as operations apace due
to low start up and running costs, along with potential
profits.  Foreign national OCGs are frequently involved
in the running of these operations and often utilise
other foreign nationals as ‘gardeners’ thus reducing
the risk of arrest for those who effectively own the
grow house. 
On both sides of the border, Chinese and Vietnamese
OCGs are heavily involved in large scale grow house
operations. Both have particular expertise and access
to specialist cultivation equipment. Links to OCGs
operating in Great Britain have also been seen.
Alongside this, growing expertise amongst indigenous
groupings has resulted in increasing involvement from
them also.  
There is some evidence in Northern Ireland to suggest
that locally cultivated cannabis has been exported to
Great Britain but in Ireland current indications are that
the cannabis produced is primarily destined for the
home market. 
OCGs continue to seek more diverse ways to house
these cannabis plants, for example in purpose built and
underground grow houses, which have been found in
both jurisdictions. Unmanned hydroponic cultivation
facilities have also now been seen on both sides of the
border, which enable cannabis to be grown faster and
with higher yields. 
Regarding domestically produced cannabis, the most
worrying issue is that consumption of cannabis
cultivated in a grow house presents a higher risk of
psychosis.  The levels of the psychoactive substance
tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), which acts as a
euphoriant / psychotogenic, is higher in domestically
grown cannabis and the levels of the anti-psychotic
substance cannabidiol (CBD) is very low.  This is now
reflected in drug treatment cases in Ireland. Between
2007 and 2012, the number of people entering
treatment with cannabis as their primary problem drug
gradually rose from 17% to 29%12.  In Northern
Ireland, cannabis remains the most commonly reported
DRUGS9
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main drug of misuse in treatment cases with 38% of
clients reporting it as such in 2012/2013 but positively,
this has declined slightly from 41% in 2011/201213.  
Higher potency cannabis increases the risk of addiction
and mental health issues such as anxiety, depression,
extreme paranoia, suicidal thoughts as well as
learning/memory problems.  Consequently, long term
high level cannabis use could result in poorer
educational outcomes, lower incomes and greater
welfare reliance.  As mentioned earlier, the majority of
cannabis dependent users are young adult males and
so they are most susceptible to such problems.  Various
studies have also reinforced these potential effects
with one study from Moore et al. concluding “There is
now sufficient evidence to warn young people that
using cannabis could increase their risk of developing
a psychotic illness later in life”.14
Cannabis cultivation as a criminal enterprise has a
ripple effect into other areas of organised crime.
Profits can be reinvested into other criminal activities,
allowing diversity and increased resilience.  As with
legitimate businesses, competition between rival gangs
exists and thus presents the possibility of
violence/intimidation.  Such rivalry has been seen
either side of the border. Innocent parties are also
affected through damage to rented properties not to
mention public health risks and fire hazards presented
by the cultivation methods. 
A significant development in the cannabis market is
the emergence of synthetic forms of cannabis in both
jurisdictions. In the UK, this is known as ‘Spice’ or
‘Black Mamba’ and has no distinctive smell. Synthetic
cannabinoids, mainly produced in powder form, are
manufactured in China and then transported onwards
to Europe.  Once within the EU, these chemicals are
mixed with or sprayed onto herbs and often
subsequently packaged as ‘legal highs’, despite being
a controlled drug in both the United Kingdom and
Ireland.  In the first six months of 2013, eighteen
countries reported seizures of synthetic cannabinoids. 
The risk of psychosis with synthetic cannabis is
reported to be much higher than with traditional
cannabis as the active ingredient can unite more
strongly to the cannabis receptors in the brain1516.  The
Global Drug Survey reports that use of synthetic
cannabis is associated with a 30 times higher risk of
seeking emergency medical treatment17.  In recent
months, several deaths have occurred in the USA that
are suspected of being attributed to synthetic cannabis
misuse18.  
New psychoactive substances
The development of a market for new psychoactive
substances has been seen throughout Europe and new
substances continue to become available at an
unprecedented rate.  The United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported that 348 new
psychoactive substances were available on the global
market as of December 201319.  The combination of
scientific advancements allowing these products to be
CASE STUDY
In July 2013, PSNI discovered a sophisticated
cannabis cultivation facility in East Belfast.  In excess
of 200 cannabis plants were recovered, however it
is believed that several previous ‘harvests’ had taken
place.  One Chinese male has since been sentenced
for immigration, fraud and drugs cultivation
offences and received a total sentence of three years
imprisonment. The judge also recommended
deportation upon release.  
On 20th April 2013, Gardaí uncovered a substantial
cannabis cultivation operation at an industrial unit
in Milltown, Co. Galway. Almost 3,000 cannabis
plants were discovered, worth an estimated €2.4
(£1.9) million. Three Chinese nationals were
convicted in relation to this and sentenced to two
concurrent sentences totalling twelve years.
On 17th April 2014, cannabis herb and cannabis
resin worth in excess of €3.8 (£3.0) million was
seized as part of an operation carried out by An
Garda Síochána and the PSNI.  Six firearms and a
quantity of ammunition were also seized.  Nine
individuals were arrested at various locations in Co.
Dublin and Co. Meath. 
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made cheaply, alongside the growth in internet use,
has led to a significant increase in their availability.
These substances can be difficult to legislate against
as their composition regularly changes, leading to
issues with identification and forensic testing.
Frequently sold online, use of the ‘dark net’ is
increasingly providing sellers with a greater degree of
anonymity and has been used to supply new
psychoactive substances to users on both sides of the
border.  The ‘dark net’ is essentially a ‘hidden’ part of
the internet that cannot be accessed using traditional
search engines and that can allow untraceable
browsing.  
New psychoactive substances are also sold in Northern
Ireland in ‘head shops’ and in both jurisdictions by
organised crime groups, alongside other drugs such as
cocaine and cannabis.  In some instances they are
misrepresented as being other products, such as
ecstasy.  On both sides of the border there have been
instances where pills have been marketed as ecstasy
but have actually contained a variety of compounds,
the combination of which may be even more life
threatening than ecstasy alone.  
Moving forward, deaths due to new psychoactive
substances remain a concern as they may not always
be recorded within available drug death statistics due
to difficulties with forensic identification.  This issue
was identified recently in Northern Ireland when police
investigations highlighted to the Coroner a number of
deaths in the past year where the uncontrolled
stimulant 4,4-dimethylaminorex (4,4-DMAR) was cited
on the death certificate.  In all cases other drugs were
also present, highlighting the ongoing concerns over
poly drug use and the abuse of new psychoactive
substances, whether they are controlled or not.
New psychoactive substances are predominantly
imported from production sites in the Far East,
particularly China.  Another example of a new
psychoactive seen in both jurisdictions has been 4-
methylethcathinone (4-MEC).  This is a stimulant drug,
similar to mephedrone, and can also be used as an
ingredient in ecstasy tablets.  There have been recent
seizures in both jurisdictions, with quantities being
imported via courier and the postal system.  4-MEC is
a Class B drug in Northern Ireland and is also illegal 
in Ireland.  
Khat, a plant with stimulant properties, has now been
criminalised in both the United Kingdom and Ireland.
In the past Khat was imported via Northern Ireland for
use in Ireland because it was legal in the United
Kingdom prior to June of this year (2014) but illegal
in Ireland.  It is mainly imported from North East Africa
and the Arabian Peninsula.  It is not always clear if the
drug is being abused by expatriate communities
locally, or whether the island of Ireland is being used
as a transit route; recent seizures have indicated
Ireland is being used as a transit point between East
Africa and North America.
CASE STUDY
In November 2013, a parcel containing 2.8kg of 
4-MEC was seized at a holiday home in Co. Donegal.
The package had been delivered from China using a
courier service and two Northern Irish residents were
subsequently arrested.  
On 20th May 2014, 50kg of Khat was seized in the
Dundalk area and two Somali nationals, one with an
address in Northern Ireland, were arrested.
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Amphetamines and Crystal
Methamphetamine
Globally, seizures of amphetamine type stimulants
(ATS) reached record highs in 2012, with seizures of
methamphetamine driving this increase20. Half of the
ATS seizures made that year occurred in North
America, highlighting the market for such substances
there.  The UK somewhat reflects this global trend with
indications of increasing amphetamine production21. 
In Ireland amphetamine seizures have seen dramatic
reductions since 2010 and seizures in 2013 were
approximately 60% less than the number recorded
three years earlier.  In Northern Ireland, indicators
would suggest a stronger market traditionally existed
there than that in Ireland or the rest of the UK.  Whilst
the market in Northern Ireland appears to remain
stable, it is becoming more difficult to assess due to
the increased availability of new psychoactive
substances that have a similar physical appearance.  
Regarding amphetamine production, a new trend is
emerging whereby traditional precursors are being
replaced with alternative precursors/pre-precursors
that are not classed as controlled substances. The
internationally controlled substance 1-phenyl-
2propanone (P-2-P), also known as benzyl methyl
ketone (BMK) and its precursor, phenylacetic acid, can
be used to produce amphetamine and
methamphetamine.  Ephedrine and pseudoephedrine
are the primary precursors for methamphetamine and
are under international control in their bulk form. 
Alphaphenylacetoacetonitrile (APAAN), which can be
converted into P-2-P, is one of the most recent
challenges within the EU drugs scene.  This pre-
precursor was placed under control within the EU at
the end of 2013 and in March 2014 it was agreed that
it should be place under international control22.
Legislation now needs to be enacted to control this
substance domestically. This pre-precursor was first
discovered in Ireland in September 2013.  The
conversion of APAAN into P-2-P is a hazardous process
involving large quantities of acid that can generate
toxic fumes as well as presenting a risk of fire or
explosions. 
The EMCDDA recently reported that whilst
methamphetamine use is not a major phenomenon in
Europe, even at a relatively low prevalence rate, it is a
drug that has the potential to cause significant harm23.
Increasing availability of the drug has been reported
within Europe25 and there are signs of growing
involvement of organised crime groups in
methamphetamine markets as well as possible
increases in production. The relatively high prevalence
rates of crystal methamphetamine smoking in the USA
and South-East Asia, has heightened concern about
the potential spread of this trend to European
countries. 
The availability of and market for crystal
methamphetamine in Ireland is highlighted through
various seizures that have been made in recent years.
The market in Ireland would appear to be centred
around a small number of Eastern European nationals,
who use over the counter pharmaceutical products
containing pseudoephedrine to produce the illegal
substance.  Large scale production has not been seen.
In Northern Ireland there is no evidence to suggest a
crystal methamphetamine market or local production.
Europol warns that the consumption of crystal meth
is expected to increase in many parts of Europe.  In
recent years, Vietnamese OCGs have expanded their
role in the production, trafficking and distribution of
crystal meth, which is impacting drugs markets across
Europe24. In the past, Vietnamese OCGs had a
concentrated production hub in the Czech Republic
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but now localised production is occurring in consumer
markets. It appears these OCGs have used their
knowledge gained through cannabis cultivation and
the supply of illicit tobacco products/counterfeit
goods, in order to establish themselves as wholesale
suppliers of crystal meth.  The production of crystal
meth also presents a more mobile process than
growing cannabis thus reducing risk of arrest. 
Cocaine
According to the European Monitoring Centre for
Drugs and Drug Abuse (EMCDDA), the long-term trend
in cocaine drug seizures within the European Union
has been moving downwards since a peak in 2006.  It
is noted, however that this may be partially due to
importers diversifying their routes and techniques.25
In Ireland, there was almost a 90% decrease in the
amount of cocaine seized in 2013 when compared to
2012, however it should be noted that there was one
seizure of over 400kg in 2012 that had inflated figures
and masked the underlying trend.  In Northern Ireland
the quantity of cocaine seized in the 2013/14 financial
year almost doubled on the previous year (up from
11.6kg in 2012/13 to 25.2kg in 2013/14), however the
general trend in quantities seized since 2006/07
remains downward.
There have been reductions in the number of cocaine
related deaths on both sides of the border.  In Ireland,
drug poisoning deaths involving cocaine saw a
significant reduction between 2006 and the most
recently available figures in 2011.  In Northern Ireland
the number of drug related deaths where cocaine is
mentioned on the death certificate saw a peak in 2008
(when six were recorded) but have reduced to between
one and four annually since.
West African organised crime groups continue to be
active in the importation of cocaine into both
jurisdictions.  Commonly noted importation methods
include baggage concealments, the use of air freight
and internal concealment using ‘drug mules’.
Although not commonplace, seizures of liquid cocaine
by authorities in Ireland over the past year indicate
that this method of importation is occurring. Seizures
have also been made in Great Britain, however there
have been no similar incidents in Northern Ireland to
date.  In December 2013, the Food Standards Agency
and Hampshire Police issued warnings to the public
after a man died having drunk a bottle of pear juice
containing liquid cocaine.  The incident occurred at an
import-export company in Southampton.    
CASE STUDY
In June 2014, PSNI seized 2kg cocaine, 8 x 9oz bars
of cannabis resin and arrested four males following
the search of two vehicles and five addresses in the
Lisburn area.  The investigation had been assisted by
An Garda Síochána officers.
On 26th June 2014, Gardaí seized 32kg of cocaine,
worth an estimated €2.24 (£1.78) million in
Donnybrook, Co. Dublin. Two males were arrested at
the scene. 
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Ecstasy
High-quality ecstasy powders and pills have re-
emerged within the EU and indeed in Ireland, on both
sides of the border.  The increased availability of
MDMA (3,4-methylenedioxy-methamphetamine)
appears to be attributed to manufacturers’ ability to
now import pre-precursors, which can be legally
imported as non-controlled substances and then
converted into the precursor chemicals necessary for
MDMA production.  This is the response employed by
OCGs following strengthened controls and focus on
PMK (piperonyl methyl ketone), the main precursor
needed for MDMA manufacture. China played a
particular role in curbing the production of PMK. 
Ecstasy production in Europe appears to be
concentrated in Belgium and the Netherlands.  In
2013, a number of substantial MDMA production sites
were dismantled in these countries, supporting
assessments that the market has been replenished. 
A key concern at present is the severe risks associated
with substances that are being sold as ‘ecstasy’. MDMA
is frequently mixed with other substances, such as
PMA (para-Methoxyamphetamine) and PMMA (para-
Methoxy-N-methylamphetamine) and in some cases
the tablets comprise entirely of these substances but
are sold as ecstasy.  
Over the past year, numerous warnings have been
issued in both Ireland and Northern Ireland following
a number of deaths and hospitalisations. Poly drug use
was frequently believed to be a contributory factor in
these fatalities.  Amongst batches that were
highlighted in these warnings were those referred to
as ‘Double Cross’/‘Double Black’, ‘Green Apple’ and
‘Green Rolex’.  
Concurrently, earlier this year, Europol and the
EMCDDA issued a warning in relation to ecstasy tablets
with dangerously high levels of MDMA.  These tablets
had the potential to cause serious harm and were
linked to several deaths in European countries. MDMA
tablets in the EU normally contain between 60
and100mg of MDMA but there are tablets in
circulation that contain between 150 and 200mg of
MDMA. In some cases, 240mg of MDMA has been
found in tablets26. 
Prescription Drugs
The misuse of prescription drugs has been highlighted
by the Organised Crime Task Force in Northern Ireland
as a growth area for a number of years27.  In both
jurisdictions deaths relating to prescription drugs
account for a significantly greater proportion than
those relating to illicit drugs.  Benzodiazepines were
mentioned on the death certificates of 44 people in
2013 in Northern Ireland, accounting for 38% of drug
related deaths28.  In Ireland, benzodiazepines were
implicated in the deaths of 166 people in 201129, an
increase of 61% on the previous year.  In some
instances individuals abuse prescription drugs as part
of a wider issue with drug abuse, using them alongside
illicit drugs such as heroin and cocaine.  Additionally,
individuals who were originally prescribed prescription
drugs may now have issues with addiction but are
unwilling to seek medical help due to embarrassment,
denial or the perceived stigma attached to drug
addiction. Deaths are increasing, potentially due to
addicted individuals failing to seek treatment and
instead taking tablets from an unreliable source (which
may lead to users taking tablets with more active
ingredients than they are used to, taking counterfeit
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tablets or taking more tablets than would normally be
prescribed by a GP) and/or increasing poly drug use.
Growth in the illicit market for prescription drugs has
led to growing concerns over poly drug use in both
jurisdictions. As highlighted throughout this
assessment, poly drug use increases the risk of adverse
effects and accidental overdose.
Supply takes place at a variety of levels; from
individuals purchasing online for their own use, right
through to organised crime groups involved in large-
scale supply as an add-on to existing illicit drug supply
businesses. Seizures have increased in both
jurisdictions and the internet is increasingly being used
to facilitate supply.  Counterfeit and unlicensed
medicines are manufactured predominantly in
Pakistan, the Far East, India and Africa and are
imported into the UK and Ireland via the postal system
and the use of couriers.  However, in Ireland localised
production is also occurring and there have been a
number of prescription drug production plants
dismantled by Gardaí in recent months.  The illicit
trade in counterfeit or falsified medicines30 may have
a significant negative impact on the Irish economy as
Ireland is one of the largest exporters of
pharmaceuticals in the world.  It has been estimated
that annually the illicit trade in pharmaceuticals can
cost the Irish pharmaceutical companies up to €3.2
(£2.5) billion, up to almost €50 (£40) million in
corporation tax loss to the Exchequer and the loss of
up to 1,500 jobs31.   
Heroin
In 2013, the global production of heroin returned to
the high levels seen in 2008 and 2011. Afghanistan,
the world’s largest opium producer, increased its area
under cultivation by 36%. Afghanistan alone accounts
for up to 80% of the world’s heroin32. 
Despite the sizeable increase in production, the
EMCDDA report that the market indicators for heroin
are stable or decreasing in Europe33.  Studies have
found that the population of Irish opiate users is
ageing34, which is also being reflected across Europe.
However, it should be noted that Ireland has one of
the strongest heroin markets in Europe and heroin
remains central to the drugs problem here, particularly
due to the severe health implications associated with
its use.  In Northern Ireland, the market is more limited
but of note is the fact that drug deaths where
heroin/morphine is mentioned on the death certificate
have significantly increased since 2008 (up from six in
2008 to 25 in 201335).  In Northern Ireland, there are
noted clusters of users within specific geographic
locations and sometimes within specific foreign
national communities. 
The transit route for heroin into Europe could be
diversifying and moving away from the traditional and
primary transit passage, known as the ‘Balkan route’
(via Pakistan, Iran and Turkey into South-Eastern
Europe)36. Heroin seizures in South-Eastern Europe fell
to a ten year low in 2012 and the most notable theory
for this decrease in flow is the emergence of
alternative routes. The strengthening of borders at
certain stages may have encouraged traffickers to seek
different routes.  One of the main alternatives is the
‘Southern Route’, which travels southward from
Afghanistan, either through Pakistan or Iran and
reaching Western and Central Europe via the Persian
Gulf and Africa or directly by air from Pakistan. The
‘Northern Route’ (via Caucasus or the Iraqi border) is
another alternative although it is assessed that this
route is presently used to transport marginal amounts
of heroin.  That said, factors such as a rise in the flow
of legal goods, new trade agreements37 and improved
infrastructure could facilitate trafficking and increase
heroin traffic on this route38. 
CASE STUDY
Between 13th and 20th May, both jurisdictions took
part in the Interpol led Operation Pangea VII,
targeting the criminal networks behind the sale of
counterfeit medicines via illicit online pharmacies.
In Northern Ireland, over 65,000 benzodiazepine
tablets, steroids and erectile dysfunction medicines
worth up to £100,000 (€126,319) were seized.  In
Ireland, illicit prescription tablets, capsules and
liquids worth just under €300,000 (£237,493) 
were seized, including sedatives, painkillers, weight
loss products, erectile dysfunction medication 
and steroids.
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There are also suggestions that traffickers are splitting
some large shipments into smaller quantities before
moving them through South-Eastern Europe. These
consignments are then consolidated after passing the
borders of South-Eastern Europe closer to primary
markets in Western and Central Europe. The discovery
of such repackaging facilities provides evidence to
support this assessment36. 
CASE STUDY
On 26th June, 8.9kgs of heroin and 2.9kgs of MDMA
were seized on the M1 at Drogheda.  Two individuals
were arrested in relation to this.  A 40 year old male
and a 43 year old female were arrested at the scene
and a second 40 year old male was subsequently
arrested in a follow up search. 
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The term Intellectual Property Crime (IPC) refers to the
counterfeiting or pirating of goods for sale where the
consent of the rights holder has not been obtained.  In
some countries IP laws are absent or inadequate, or
there is a general lack of enforcement action thus
providing a substantial production of counterfeit
goods for importation into the United Kingdom and
Ireland.  The recession and global economic crisis may
have made counterfeit goods more attractive to
consumers, and advancements in technology allow
easier production and distribution at both a global 
and local level. Europol identifies commodity
counterfeiting as well as the illicit trade in substandard
goods and goods violating health and safety
regulations as emerging criminal markets in the
European Union39.
Counterfeit goods continue to be widely available in
both jurisdictions and are increasingly sold online, as
well as via more traditional locations such as markets,
car boot sales, door-to-door, in the workplace and
from homes.  The internet is used to facilitate the
importation, advertisement and local distribution of
counterfeit goods on both sides of the border.  Many
of these items are imported, however some items, such
as counterfeit CDs and DVDs and alcohol, can be
produced locally.  The range of goods available
continues to develop, with seized goods including
clothing, DVDs and CDs, computer software, footwear,
alcohol, make up, perfume, cigarettes and tobacco,
pharmaceuticals, hair styling irons and other electrical
items.  In June 2014, An Garda Síochána seized
€43,000 (£34,024) worth of counterfeit washing
powder in the Rathcoole area of Co. Dublin.  Similar
manufacturing facilities have been found north of the
border in previous years.  There is a significant risk of
counterfeit goods such as washing powder entering
the legitimate supply chain and being sold in shops to
unsuspecting customers.
Food fraud remains a growing concern within the
European Union, including Ireland and the United
Kingdom.  Food fraud can take a number of forms but
the most common seen are the sale of food which is
unfit and potentially harmful (e.g. by recycling animal
by-products back into the food chain or selling beef
and poultry of an unknown origin) and the deliberate
false description of food (e.g. by substituting products
with a cheaper alternative, like selling farmed salmon
as ‘wild’ or by making false statements about the
origin of ingredients).   Food fraud may also involve
the sale of meat from animals that have been stolen
and/or illegally slaughtered, as well as wild game
animals that have been illegally poached.  There is
growing recognition of the complex and organised
nature of ‘food crime’40, with organised crime groups
beginning to recognise the potential to make
significant profits from a crime type they may perceive
to be low risk.  Local examples of food fraud that have
potential links to organised crime include the
suspected illegal movement of milk from Ireland into
Northern Ireland, the alleged illegal slaughter of cattle
and pigs in a border location and the illegal butchery
of carcases discovered at a location also near the
border.  In the third example, a significant distribution
chain was uncovered that implicated businesses on
both sides of the border. Laundered fuel was also
found on the premises concerned.  
Those involved in the counterfeit goods market are
often linked to other types of criminality, including
some other forms of organised crime.  Common links
include benefit fraud, drugs supply and money
laundering. 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIME
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Money laundering 
The laundering of criminal proceeds is pivotal to the
success, reward and resilience of any major organised
grouping. Money is legitimatised for use as personal
profit, reinvestment in additional ventures and in some
cases as funding for terrorist activities.  In Ireland, it
has been estimated that over €5.4 billion (£4.3 billion)
was laundered in 2012 alone41, and in the UK the
Treasury estimate £10 billion (€12.5 billion) of illicit
funds pass through the ‘regulated sector’ annually42.
Worldwide estimates indicate $1.6 trillion (€1.19
trillion, £0.59 trillion) is laundered by criminals
annually43. 
The global economy is becoming more susceptible to
money laundering through new or free trade
agreements, new methods of banking and the
expanding role that developing countries are playing
in the global scene.  Rapid developments in the
technology field are a particular aid to money
laundering. Monetary transactions can now be carried
out online and more recently, the emergence of
unregulated virtual currencies and online casinos
provide additional mechanisms to criminals.  Across
the worldwide economy, there are variations in
legislation and OCGs will continually seek to exploit
weaknesses these differences present. 
The presence of online currencies, such as the most
popular Bitcoin, offer criminals anonymity to
exchange illicit monies for virtual currencies and to
process irreversible transactions that are complicated
for authorities to trace.  Virtual currencies are not
regulated or issued by any bank and often operate in
jurisdictions that are not known for their co-operation
with law enforcement agencies here.  As well as being
used to facilitate money laundering, these currencies
are used to purchase illegal goods and services.  Virtual
currencies allow criminals to evade the secure
systems/controls employed by traditional banking and
facilitate criminality linked to money laundering,
cybercrime and in some cases, a nation’s security. 
More traditional methods of money laundering
continue to be utilised including the purchase of high
value goods for cash, the transfer of funds overseas
through financial institutions, filtering of funds
through companies and the purchase of property here
and abroad.  Some Money Service Bureaus (MSBs)
along the border region have in the past facilitated the
laundering of substantial amounts of criminal
proceeds.  Pre-paid money cards and in some cases
retail gift cards also act as a facilitator in this regard
as large amounts of money can be carried using
multiple cards but go undetected when criminals are
travelling abroad.  Such cards are easily obtained and
can be difficult to trace. 
To effectively tackle money laundering, strong anti-
money laundering (AML) measures must be in place.
The UK and Ireland have made considerable progress
in this regard over the past number of years and such
efforts need to be continually developed.  Assessments
by the main international money laundering body, the
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering
(FATF), were beneficial in driving this progress in
Ireland.  Most notable amongst these efforts in Ireland
was the introduction of the Criminal Justice (Money
Laundering and Terrorist Financing) Act 2010 and the
amendment and broadening of this act in 2013.  One
of the key provisions in the amended act is the
lowering of the threshold for reporting some high-
value transactions to €15,000 for transactions that
appear to be linked, €2,000 for private members club
transactions and to €1,000 in the case of wire transfer
funds.  The EU plans to introduce a Fourth Money
Laundering Directive in late 2015, which will aim to
further expand AML systems. This directive will require
Ireland to review current regulations and prepare for
additional amendments.  
In Northern Ireland, the Proceeds of Crime Act provides
the main framework for the recovery of criminal
proceeds.  The full value of criminal assets recovered
in Northern Ireland is put back into the local economy,
MONEY LAUNDERING AND FRAUD
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with 50% returned to law enforcement agencies in
order to enhance their recovery efforts and 50% used
to help fund community projects that reduce crime or
the fear of it. In Ireland, the Criminal Assets Bureau’s
statutory objective is to deny and deprive people of
the benefits of assets that are the proceeds of criminal
conduct through the frameworks of the Proceeds of
Crime Act, Revenue legislation and social welfare
legislation. Under this process, money that is
accumulated by the Bureau is paid into the
Government’s Central Fund.   Within Northern Ireland
the National Crime Agency, which came into operation
in October 2013, can only operate in the non devolved
field (for example on immigration and revenue
matters).  This is because political agreement has not
been reached on a model for its operation and
accountability in the devolved arena.  This is creating
a gap in law enforcement, in the support that can be
provided to the PSNI, and in respect of civil recovery
in devolved cases.
Fraud
A significant proportion of frauds, such as ‘advance
fee’ frauds are now perpetrated online or are at least
partially facilitated through the online environment.
Variations of ‘advance fee’ fraud can be wide ranging
but essentially involve any type of fraud where the
injured party is asked to pay money upfront for goods
or services.  There has been a noted increase in advance
fee frauds involving ‘electronic money’ or ‘e-money’.  
‘Vishing’ attacks are reported to be on the increase,
which involve fraudsters obtaining personal details of
a victim by phone that they can potentially use to
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commit fraud.  One particular series of note involves
injured parties being contacted by phone by someone
claiming to be from their bank.  They are told their
account security has been compromised and that they
need to change their passwords, resulting in these
security details being inadvertently given to the
fraudster.  This is known as an ‘account takeover’,
whereby the criminals can take money from the
victim’s bank account. In Northern Ireland, significant
incidents have included business losses of hundreds of
thousands of pounds.   
Fraudulent schemes such as Ponzi/Pyramid schemes
have been identified as operating on both sides of the
border.  Investors are paid returns from subsequent
investors rather than from profit earned by the
‘investments’.  Large numbers of victims are often
affected by such schemes when the cash flow finally
comes to a halt. 
Share fraud (also referred to as Boiler Room Fraud) is
a scam that aims to persuade victims to buy shares in
a company that the fraudster claims to be genuine.
The name of the company often sounds very similar to
a well known financial company, which boosts
attempts to make it appear genuine. In reality, the
company is not trading on the stock exchange and
therefore it is virtually impossible for the victim to sell
on the “shares”.
Fraud involving carbon credit schemes is reported to
be particularly prevalent at present.  Victims are
approached by firms trying to sell worthless carbon
credit certificates or seeking investments into ‘green’
projects that will generate carbon credits as a return.
Carbon credits or Certified Emission Reductions (CERs)
are traded in bulk amongst companies and there are
many reputable firms operating in this business.  Older
people are particularly susceptible to this kind of 
crime where high pressure tactics are employed to
obtain the sale. 
Intra-Community VAT Fraud (also referred to as
‘missing trader’ or ‘carousel’ fraud) exploits EU trade
agreements and occurs throughout the EU.  The land
border between Northern Ireland and Ireland presents
increased risk of this form of fraud and Revenue
authorities on both sides of the border continually
work together to tackle this criminality.  In May 2013,
a ‘Good Practice Guide to tackling Intra-Community
VAT Fraud’ was distributed to member states and
outlines best practises on targeting VAT fraud. This
guide was prepared by EUROFISC, which is a network
of officials in EU member states.  ‘Missing trader’
describes the situation where a trader purchases VAT
free goods from another EU state, then sells on the
goods here at VAT inclusive price and proceeds to
abscond without remitting the VAT charged to the
Revenue authorities. ‘Carousel fraud’ is a particular
form of ‘missing trader’ fraud, where goods bought in
another member state are sold on through a series of
companies before being re-exported (possibly back to
the original supplier).  VAT fraud particularly affects
the plant/machinery sector, motor vehicles, soft drinks
but other sectors are also involved. 
CASE STUDY
In July 2014, a male pleaded guilty to numerous
charges relating to the operation of a Ponzi scheme
in Ireland. It was reported that five victims, all of
whom he befriended over time, lost approximately
€8.5 million (£6.8 million) as a result of this
fraudulent scheme. This male is due to be sentenced
in October 2014. 
In June 2014, a confiscation order for over £1 million
(€1.26 million) was obtained against an individual
in Northern Ireland who had been sentenced to
seven years imprisonment in relation to a significant
seizure of herbal cannabis in May 2012.
In early 2014, following a re-trial, a conviction for
money laundering was attained against a 65 year
old male resident in Ireland for the laundering of
proceeds of a bank robbery that occurred in Belfast
almost ten years previously. 
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The increasing price of fuel globally continues to make
oils fraud an attractive opportunity for organised
crime groups.  There are four main kinds of illegal fuel
related activities; smuggling, mixing, stretching and
fuel laundering.  In the past, price differentials
between Northern Ireland and Ireland made the
smuggling of fuel from one jurisdiction to the other
profitable. However changes in exchange and duty
rates have also enticed organised crime groups to
become involved in other areas of fuel fraud, such as
‘stretching’ (the adulteration of fuel to bulk it out) and
laundering.  Fuel laundering, which offers the greatest
monetary incentive, is a process whereby marker dye
contained in rebated fuels such as Marked Gas Oil
(MGO) and kerosene44 is removed and then sold on as
road diesel at lower prices. 
The price differential between road diesel and marked
diesel is one of the drivers behind this crime. In
January 2014, Ireland was reported to have the sixth
highest price in the EU at the pump for diesel at €1.48
(£1.18) per litre and marked diesel was significantly
cheaper with 30% in difference45. In Northern Ireland
‘at the pump’ prices are higher, at an average price of
£1.34 (€1.69) per litre46. 
As well as the substantial cost to the exchequer, other
consequences include the financial impact on
legitimate retailers, damage to consumers’ vehicles and
the significant environmental damage from toxic 
by-products. HMRC estimate that the cost to the
Exchequer is £160 (€201) million in Northern Ireland47.
In Ireland, Revenue do not measure the tax gap but
OILS FRAUD
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industry figures estimate this to be between €140
(£111) and €260 (£207) million48. Fuel laundering
creates large quantities of waste product, which is
usually dumped by the OCGs and often results in the
contamination of surrounding land and waterways.
The ensuing clean-up costs in these instances can be
extensive. 
In 2013, HMRC detected and dismantled 38 illegal
laundering plants in Northern Ireland and seized a total
of 574,238 litres of fuel. As of mid August 2014, sixteen
oil laundries had been uncovered in Northern Ireland.
In Ireland, Gardaí and Customs detected nine fuel
laundering plants in 2013 and closed down twenty five
stations involved in oils fraud. In the first six months
of 2014, this has reduced and only one fuel laundering
plant has been detected in Ireland. Although this
activity is mainly concentrated along the border, there
has been a movement away from this area in both
Northern Ireland and Ireland.  Over the past year,
laundering operations were found in Dublin, Waterford,
Coalisland, Co. Tyrone and Banbridge, Co. Down. 
Bleaching earth is used to launder fuel and as this
substance has a wide range of legitimate uses, there
are no controls or regulations on its supply. The use of
bleaching earth allows mobility in the operations and
efficient plants concealed within truck and agricultural
trailers have been discovered. 
Since the intensification of fuel laundering activities in
2011, Irish Revenue Commissioners have implemented
significant measures to strengthen controls. These
include but are not limited to the following. In 2011,
licence requirements were strengthened and this was
effective in closing ‘pop up’ shops in Ireland. 2012 saw
the introduction of licences for all traders dealing in
marked gas oil or road diesel. In 2013, regulations were
enforced whereby fuel traders are obliged to make
electronic returns in relation to their fuel transactions
each month, thus making it more difficult for criminals
to source marked fuel. Also last year a system of direct
delivery for cross border mineral oil movement was
introduced, which along with the aforementioned
measures has strengthened the control systems around
cross border activity.  
In December 2013, the Finance (No. 2) Act 2013 was
enacted and makes a supplier who is ‘reckless’ in
supplying market fuel for a use connected with excise
fraud, liable to duty at the standard rate. This has been
effective in deterring traders from supplying fuel to
launderers, either directly or indirectly. 
In Northern Ireland, legislation to allow the appeal of
unduly lenient sentences for excise evasion on fuel and
tobacco came into effect in December last year.  This
new legislation adds excise evasion on fuel and
tobacco to the list of offences on which the Director
of Public Prosecutions can refer a sentence considered
to be unduly lenient to the Court of Appeal.   
Most significant amongst efforts to tackle this kind of
crime is the joint project that identified a new product
to mark rebated fuels by the Revenue Commissioners
and Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC). Tests
have shown that the marker is highly resistant to
known laundering techniques and organised crime
groups will find it very difficult to counter this
colourless marker. This marker, which is produced by
Dow Chemicals, is due to be implemented
simultaneously in both jurisdictions in early 2015 and
it is anticipated that it will have a major impact on this
illegal activity. Consequently, it can be expected that
fuel smugglers will look to find other methods of
maintaining finances with cigarette smuggling
probably the most incentful.  
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To date, the enhanced control systems in Ireland
appear to have been effective in curtailing OCGs
involved in fuel laundering, although a longer term
assessment would be required to show the full impact.
Amongst indicators of this is an increase in sales of
road diesel along with data from Louth County Council
showing a 52% decrease in oil sludge discoveries for
the first four months of 2014 in comparison to the
same period last year. Also, as aforementioned only
one fuel laundering plant was detected in Ireland in
the first six months of the year.  Unfortunately in
Northern Ireland, laundering plants continue to be
found in significant numbers, with sixteen discovered
between January and August 2014. 
However, despite these controls and positive indicators,
a number of major OCGs are still sourcing marked
diesel, albeit in limited quantities. These OCGs ensure
that they have sufficient licensing outlets to distribute
their fuel and many such outlets are directly under
their control. These outlets appear legitimate but
where necessary the grouping will employ tactics of
threats and intimidation to gain this control.
Particularly vulnerable are previously legitimate
traders, who now find themselves under financial
strain. These individuals are identified by OCGs and
offered financial investment in exchange for a share
in the business. The entire focus of the business
becomes the sourcing of marked oil for laundering
purposes. 
The Cross Border Fuel Fraud Enforcement Group was
established in 2008 and continues to target groupings
involved in this activity, particular those operating
along the border area.
CASE STUDY
In May 2014, HMRC detected two laundering plants
in the south Armagh area, including 15 tonnes of
waste.  PSNI officers made four arrests at one of the
sites.  In addition, HMRC officers also detected and
seized one illegal fuel movement, seizing a total of
96,551 litres of fuel at six retail sites, one huckster
site and one bunkering site.  
In September 2013, HMRC discovered a fuel
laundering plant near Newry.  The sophisticated site
was capable of laundering and packaging an
estimated 24 million litres of diesel a year.  One male
was arrested in connection with the investigation. 
On 11th April 2013, Customs and the Gardaí
uncovered two mobile laundering plants in
Ravensdale Park, Dundalk, Co. Louth. These laundries
had the capacity to launder 15 million litres of fuel
per year and presented a potential loss of €8 million
(£6.3 million) per year. One of the mobile units was
concealed in a curtain sided lorry and the second
unit was a slurry tank that had been adapted for use
as a mobile fuel laundry. 100 bags of bleaching
earth, 6,000 litres of fuel and six vehicles were also
seized. Additionally, three tonnes of toxic waste was
discovered at the site.  
The discovery of a sophisticated fuel laundering
plant at a commercial premise in Portlaw, Co.
Waterford on the 18th November 2013 highlights
the movement away from the border region. This
plant had the capacity to launder 10 million litres of
fuel per annum, presenting a potential yearly loss of
€5 million (£3.95 million) to the exchequer. 
A number of large tanks and ancillary equipment
were also detained. 
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Abuse of the Common Travel Area
A Common Travel Area (CTA) is in existence between
Ireland and the UK. This provides major benefits to those
who live in both jurisdictions, in terms of free
movement and trade.  It can, however be open to
exploitation by illegal migrants and those within
criminal intent, such as those involved in human
trafficking, smuggling and the exploitation of the social
welfare system.  Immigration officers conducting
immigration controls at the land border between Ireland
and Northern Ireland may ask questions to establish if
a person is an Irish or UK national.  Non-Irish/UK
nationals are not required to be in possession of a
passport or equivalent documentation when travelling
from one jurisdiction in the CTA to another.  
The Immigration Unit is operated by Gardaí at Dundalk,
Co. Louth and concentrates on immigration controls on
the Dublin/Belfast bus and train routes. In the first six
months of 2014, 112 non-nationals were refused entry
into Ireland from Northern Ireland.
Authorities on both sides of the border work in
partnership to intercept immigration offenders that may
be transiting Ireland to reach the United Kingdom and
vice versa.  Illegal immigrants with serious criminal
records have been intercepted in both jurisdictions and
potential victims of human trafficking have also been
recovered as a direct result of this cooperative approach.
Marriages of convenience
Marriages of convenience, also known as ‘sham
marriages’, usually involve the making of a payment by,
or on behalf of, an illegal immigrant who is a non EU
national, to a national of an EU Member State, in return
for that person entering into a marriage with the illegal
immigrant.  The non EU national subsequently claims
EU Treaty Rights relating to residency in the EU, based
on the existence of the marriage.  Organised facilitators
will arrange such marriages for a fee, usually sourcing
the ‘spouse’ and arranging the ceremony on behalf of
the illegal immigrant.  Payment to a facilitator can be
thousands of pounds/Euro and may result in the illegal
immigrant becoming ‘debt bonded’ and forced to
provide unpaid labour in order to pay off the money
they owe. 
Under current legislation in Ireland, it is very difficult
to prevent a suspected marriage of convenience from
taking place. There are proposals to bring in new
legislation to regulate this area and address the issue.
For example, there are provisions in the Immigration
Residence and Protection Bill 2010, which would give
the Minister for Justice and Equality, in certain
circumstances, power to disregard a marriage of
convenience where the marriage may be factor in
determining an immigration matter. However this bill
has yet to be enacted. Last year, there were also
proposals to draft legislation amending the Civil
Registration Act 2004, which would introduce measures
to combat sham marriages49. 
ORGANISED IMMIGRATION CRIME
AND HUMAN EXPLOITATION
CASE STUDY
In December 2013, a male pleaded guilty to a
number of charges in relation to the facilitation of
‘marriages of convenience’.  The majority of these
marriages had been between Bangladeshi men and
Portuguese women, and they had taken place on
both sides of the border.  He received a three and a
half year prison sentence, suspended for three years.
In April 2014, two confiscation orders were granted
against a female in Northern Ireland.  The first order
related to her conviction for fraud and money
laundering with an associated benefit of £98,354
(€123,926).  The second related to her conviction
for conspiracy to arrange ‘marriages of convenience’
with an associated benefit of £40,500 (€51,030).
The woman was given six months to pay, with a
maximum sentence of two years in default of the
fraud order, and 18 months for the ‘marriages of
convenience’ order.  
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Human exploitation – trafficking and vice
In recent years, we have seen a number of organised
crime groups involved in organised prostitution and
brothel keeping throughout the island of Ireland.  Access
to prostitution has changed significantly and is now
predominantly carried out off street with advertising
usually done online.  Prostitutes are moved around
between locations to reduce the risk of detection.  In
some instances those working in prostitution are doing
so of their own volition, however there is also
involvement by OCGs in both brothel keeping and the
trafficking of human beings for the purposes of sexual
exploitation.  Growing psychological coercion may be
accompanying the problem of human trafficking for the
purposes of sexual exploitation.  In Northern Ireland,
human trafficking victims that have travelled across
Europe unaccompanied have come to the attention 
of authorities.   
Organised crime groups facilitate the illegal entry of
immigrants into the United Kingdom and Ireland by
providing false documents and organising travel for a
fee.  In some cases the illegal entrant will be complicit
(people smuggling) but in others they may be left debt
bonded or will have been trafficked for the purposes of
exploitation (human trafficking).  A full definition of
human trafficking is given in the Council of Europe
Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human
Beings, which was ratified in the UK and Ireland in
200850.  Trafficking involves a combination of three main
elements – recruitment and movement, control and
coercion, and exploitation.  The control exercised by the
trafficker may be physical or psychological.  Both Ireland
and Northern Ireland are destination, source and transit
countries.  In both jurisdictions there have been limited
successful prosecutions for human trafficking offences;
it can be a difficult area of criminality to evidence as
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victims may be unwilling or unable to provide
statements at trial.  It is important to note however that
organised crime groups suspected of being involved in
human trafficking in both jurisdictions have been
charged with a variety of other serious offences, some
of which have resulted in significant prison sentences.
In 2013, there were 38 potential victims of human
trafficking recovered in Northern Ireland.  In Ireland the
most recent figures are from 2012, when there were 48
potential victims recovered.  In both jurisdictions, the
most commonly encountered potential victims are those
that are believed to have been trafficked for the
purposes of sexual exploitation.  However, the area of
forced labour appears to be an emerging one.  In
general, there is growing awareness of forced labour
issues within migrant communities and whilst not all
will have been victims of human trafficking, they are
being exploited and may subsequently become victims
of internal trafficking if moved between locations.  In
both jurisdictions there are also potential victims who
are believed to have been trafficked for purposes
unknown.  These potential victims will often have been
recovered prior to the exploitation having taken place,
which is indicative of the increased awareness amongst
law enforcement and other first responders.
In both jurisdictions a significant proportion of potential
victims of sexual exploitation under the age of 18 have
been British or Irish.  These internal trafficking victims
are usually teenage girls with those living in local
authority care being particularly vulnerable. Such
victims are less likely to have been exploited in the
context of prostitution but rather other sexual offences
relating to child pornography, sexual assault and sexual
indecency.    
Legislation in relation to human trafficking and slavery
continues to go through significant amendment on
both sides of the border as knowledge of the problem
increases.  In Ireland, current trafficking and
pornography laws have recently been amended to
include forcing a person to beg and forced labour for
the purpose of monetary gain.  In Northern Ireland,
amended legislation has been proposed in Lord
Morrow’s Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Further
Provisions and Support for Victims) Bill, and as a result
of the Modern Slavery Bill.
CASE STUDY
In August 2014, two men were arrested in Northern
Ireland in relation to a people smuggling
investigation in England.  A shipping container was
recovered at Tilbury Docks in England, in which one
Afghan national died and a further 34 were found
inside a shipping container.
In December 2013, a joint investigation team (JIT)
led by the PSNI, resulted in a lengthy criminal trial
in Stockholm, Sweden.  A Romanian national who
was arrested in Belfast on a European Arrest Warrant
and extradited to Sweden was found guilty of
trafficking human beings for sexual exploitation and
aggravated procuring. A second Romanian national
who was arrested in Bucharest on a European Arrest
Warrant and extradited to Sweden was found guilty
of complicity in trafficking human beings for sexual
exploitation, aggravated procurement and the
Swedish equivalent of witness intimidation.  Both
received a total of four years imprisonment and a
large monetary fine.  Deportation Orders were also
directed on completion of sentence.
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The illicit tobacco products importation, manufacture
and supply network operates on a cross border basis
with organised crime groups spanning both
jurisdictions.  It is estimated that 24% of adults in
Northern Ireland51 and 29% of adults in Ireland
currently smoke52. In 2011, the average daily
consumption per smoker was estimated by the UK
Treasury as being 13 cigarettes a day for men and 12
for women.  Taking the lower estimate, smokers on the
island of Ireland could be expected to consume over 283
million packs of 20 cigarettes annually53.  The price of
tobacco products continues to rise, making the illicit
industry attractive to organised crime groups.  
The recommended retail price (RRP) of a typical pack of
20 cigarettes in the Most Popular Price Category (MPPC)
in the UK has increased by 77% in the past ten years,
up from £4.51 (€5.68) in 2003, to £7.98 (€10.06) in
201354. In Ireland, the premium recommended retail
price for a pack of 20 cigarettes is €9.60 (£7.62).  These
RRPs are significantly higher than that seen in other EU
countries.  In Belgium the typical price is €5.04 (£4.00),
in Spain it is around €4.79 (£3.80), in Poland it is around
€3.34 (£2.65) and in Belarus it is just €0.92 (£0.73)55.
Hand rolling tobacco (HRT), whilst offering a cheaper
alternative to cigarettes, is also rising in price and is
available at a much cheaper rate in other parts of the
European Union.   
Organised crime groups are involved in the smuggling
of non duty paid tobacco products, counterfeit brands
and also ‘illicit whites’. The term ‘illicit whites’ refers to
cigarettes that are produced independently of the
International Tobacco Manufacturers (ITMs). They are
mainly manufactured outside the European Union
TOBACCO FRAUD 
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and/or in Free Trade Zones but there is now evidence
showing that illicit white production is also occurring
within the EU56. In some cases concerning non EU
countries, illicit whites will be manufactured
legitimately but as they are not registered within the
European Union, they are illegal here.  The majority of
illicit whites are produced specifically for the purpose
of being smuggled into another market and the demand
is increasing as they are seen as a cheaper alternative
to inferior quality counterfeit brands.  Counterfeit
cigarettes (copies of ITM brands) are usually produced
in the Far East and used to dominate the illicit market.
Counterfeit products are of varying quality and usually
involve clandestine manufacture, whereas illicit whites
can be openly produced and are seen as being of better
quality.  HRT is also smuggled from countries where it is
available at a cheaper rate. 
Illicit tobacco products are imported using varying
methods, such as through commercial freight, by private
vehicle, in postal importation and through the use of
air passengers as ‘mules’. Organised crime groups appear
to be moving away from large consignments in favour
of smaller volumes as a result of a number of large
seizures made throughout Europe.  Tobacco products
are possibly being transported through Eastern
European and Mediterranean countries to warehouses
in central Europe where they are then broken down and
transported onwards.  It also gives the appearance that
the consignment is intra community legitimate freight.
This is reflected in the decline in seizures of whole
cigarettes in Ireland over the past few years.  
More recently, local organised crime groups have
become involved in the importation of unmanufactured
tobacco.  Specialised machinery can then be used to
process the unmanufactured tobacco into HRT.  Her
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs seized machinery in
England that was en route to Northern Ireland in April
of this year and in May, Irish Revenue Commissioners
and An Garda Síochána discovered a processing facility
of this nature in Dundalk.  Law enforcement also
believes locally based organised crime groups are using
manufacturing equipment to produce illicit cigarettes
in border locations.  Counterfeit packaging and
counterfeit customs stamps are imported separately.
There have been some noted links between the local
manufacture of HRT and organised crime groups
involving Chinese nationals.  There is also a noted
increase in the use of self storage facilities to allow illicit
cigarettes, tobacco and equipment to be delivered to
and stored at an address that may be less easily traced
back to the organised crime group. 
There appears to be a developing market amongst the
Middle Eastern community in Ireland and the UK for
shisha (Al Fakher) tobacco.  A shisha is a water pipe,
popular in many Arab countries, in which tobacco that
is often fruit-scented can be smoked through a hose or
tube. In June 2014, there was a significant seizure of
shisha tobacco in Drogheda from an organised crime
group believed to be operating and supplying illicit
tobacco products on both sides of the border and in
Great Britain.  
Ireland is the first EU state planning to introduce
legislation enforcing tobacco companies to use plain
packaging on all tobacco products sold in the
jurisdiction. There are conflicting predictions by various
parties involved in the tobacco trade / law enforcement
on the potential impact that this will have on the illicit
trade. One concern is that it will be more difficult for
consumers to differentiate between illicit/genuine
packs57. In Northern Ireland a move towards plain
packaging has been discussed; however the Department
of Health feel there should be a UK wide approach 
so the issue is not being promoted locally at the 
current time.
CASE STUDY
In June 2014, Irish Revenue Commissioners and An
Garda Síochána seized 32 million illicit cigarettes
and almost five tonnes of shisha tobacco at
Drogheda Port.  At the time of the seizure it
represented the largest seizure of cigarettes in
Europe to date this year.  HMRC subsequently carried
out follow up searches in England, and PSNI and
HMRC officers carried out searches in the south
Armagh area.  One male company director was
arrested on suspicion of tobacco smuggling.
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Vehicle crime can often be a highly organised criminal
activity that provides significant finances for criminal
groupings. This form of crime is not an isolated activity
and stolen vehicles are frequently used to finance other
criminal ventures or for logistical purposes in burglaries,
drug trafficking or violent endeavours. The onward sale
to innocent buyers frequently occurs via internet
adverts and can subsequently involve a number of
scams, all with the intention of distancing the criminal
from the buyer. Also vehicles can be stolen in this
manner, for example when false bank drafts are used by
criminals in a private sale. It is important for members
of the public to be vigilant when purchasing a second-
hand vehicle or making a sale. 
The market for stolen car parts has been growing in
recent years, whilst interest in the fraudulent sale of
whole stolen vehicles appears to be declining. On both
sides of the border, an increased number of ‘Chop Shops’
have been detected where criminals are actively running
illegal dismantling operations. It is believed that some
of the car parts are being exported, mainly to Eastern
European countries. There are evident cross border links
to this activity and searches conducted on either side
of the border have resulted in the discovery of vehicles
from both jurisdictions. 
The repair and maintenance of vehicles now appears to
be aided by sourcing parts from stolen vehicles such as
airbags, engines, gear boxes and body panels, amongst
other items. In Ireland, there has been cases where
imported crashed/written off cars were being repaired
using parts from a stolen car of the same make. The
repaired car was subsequently sold to an unsuspecting
buyer at a competitive price.  The individuals involved
in this can be very skilled and whilst the vehicle may be
visually perfect thus appearing like a genuine
undamaged car, faulty air bags can be fitted or
electronic circuits bypassed to prevent faults being
highlighted on the dashboard. Consequently, these
vehicles present serious safety risks. 
Reflecting the economic downturn, there is reduced
demand on both sides of the border for construction
plant and machinery. However it is believed that 
some plant machinery will still be stolen here and
shipped abroad. 
The trend of ‘Ghost Thefts’ is occurring across the island
of Ireland and across Europe in general. Vehicles are
stolen without the original keys being taken from the
owners using hi tech electronic devices that mimic the
signal emitted by key fobs. Some high powered vehicles
have been identified as particularly vulnerable to this
form of theft. As detailed above, some of these cars are
being dismantled for the car parts market.
VEHICLE CRIME
CASE STUDY
Following the identification of cross border car theft
operation in Newry, Co. Down, PSNI and An Garda
Síochána began a proactive investigation focussing
on an Eastern European organised crime group
specialising in the theft of high value BMWs. In May
2014, a search operation was conducted at a garage
in Co. Fermanagh and a number of stolen vehicles
were recovered as well as car parts suspected to be
from other stolen vehicles.  These vehicles had been
stolen on both sides of the border.  Four Latvian
nationals were arrested at the scene.
In April 2014, a Latvian national was also arrested in
Newry, Co. Down following co-operation between
Gardaí and PSNI. The premises involved was
suspected of being used for the purpose of
dismantling stolen vehicles and a substantial
number of vehicles/parts were recovered by the
PSNI. Some of these vehicles had been stolen 
in Ireland.
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